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Abstract 
Purpose – A major lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria in a monetary union 
result from arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. With the specter of 
this crisis looming substantially and scarring existing monetary zones, the present study has 
complemented existing literature by analyzing the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity (output and prices) in the CEMAC and UEMOA CFA franc zones.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – VARs within the frameworks of VECMs and Granger 
causality models are used to estimate the long-run and short-run effects respectively. Impulse 
response functions are further used to assess the tendencies of significant Granger causality 
findings. A battery of robustness checks are also employed to ensure consistency in the 
specifications and results.  
 
Findings – Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in 
the short-run in the CFA zones (Broadly untrue). This invalidity is more pronounced in 
CEMAC (relative to all monetary policy variables) than in UEMOA (with regard to financial 
dynamics of activity and size). Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in 
the short-term but not in the long-run in the CFA zones. Firstly, the absence of co-integration 
among real output and the monetary policy variables in both zones confirm the long-term 
dimension of the hypothesis on the neutrality of money. The validity of its short-run 
dimension is more relevant in the UEMOA zone (with the exception of overall money supply) 
than in the CEMAC zone (in which only financial dynamics of ‘financial system efficiency’ 
and financial activity support the hypothesis). 
 
Practical Implications – (1) Compared to the CEMAC region, the UEMOA zone’s monetary 
authority has more policy instruments for offsetting output shocks but fewer instruments for 
the management of short-run inflation. (2) The CEMAC region is more inclined to non-
traditional policy regimes while the UEMOA zone dances more to the tune of traditional 
discretionary monetary policy arrangements. A wide range of policy implications are 
discussed. Inter alia: implications for the long-run neutrality of money and business cycles; 
implications for credit expansions and inflationary tendencies; implications of the findings to 
the ongoing debate; country-specific implications and measures of fighting surplus liquidity.   
 
Originality/value – By using a plethora of hitherto unemployed financial dynamics (that 
broadly reflect money supply), we have provided a significant contribution to the empirics of 
monetary policy. The conclusion of the analysis is a valuable contribution to the scholarly and 
policy debate on how money matters as an instrument of economic activity in developing 
countries and monetary unions.   
 
JEL Classification: E51; E52; E58; E59; O55 
Keywords:  Monetary Policy; Banking; Inflation; Output effects; Africa 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 The European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis is looming substantially and scarring 
existing monetary zones. The crisis has led to renewed interest in the economics of monetary 
union. This has resurfaced many issues in the debate on monetary policy. First and foremost, 
whereas in large industrial economies, changes in monetary policy affect real economic 
activity in the short-run (but only prices in the long-term), in transition (and developing) 
countries the question of whether monetary policy variables have an incidence on output in 
the short-run has been open to debate (Starr, 2005). Secondly, the evidence of real effects in 
developed countries is consistent with the idea that monetary policy can be used to counter 
aggregate shocks.  From a traditional perspective, economic theory suggest that money affects 
the business cycle but not the long-term potential real output; an indication that monetary 
policy is neutral in the distant future. Despite the substantially documented theoretical and 
empirical consensus on this long-term neutrality (Lucas, 1980, Olekalns, 1996; Sarletis & 
Koustas, 1998; Bernanke & Mihov, 1998; Bullard, 1999; Gerlach & Svensson, 2003; Bae et 
al., 2005; Nogueira, 2009), the role of money as an informational variable for decision 
making has remained open to scholarly debate  (Roffia & Zaghini, 2008; Nogueira, 2009; 
Bhaduri & Durai, 2012)
1
. Thirdly, the potential incidence of monetary policy variables on 
prices is also less clear. For example, in countries that have experienced significant inflation 
or in which labor markets are substantially slack, prices and wages are less likely to be 
particularly sticky so that, monetary policy variations could pass quickly through prices and 
have very weak real effects (Gagnon & Ihrig, 2004). Moreover, the globalization of financial 
markets undercut the potential of independent monetary policy by significantly dissipating the 
ability of small-open countries (economies) to determine interest rates independently of world 
markets (Dornbusch, 2001; Frankel et al., 2004). 
                                                 
1
 Accordingly, the empirical literature reveals mixed results and the outcomes are contingent on selected 
countries and historical periods under investigation (Dwyer & Hafer, 1999; Stock & Watson, 1999; Trecroci & 
Vega-Croissier, 2000; Leeper  & Roush, 2002; Bae et al., 2005). 
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As far as we have reviewed, few studies have recently examined existing monetary 
unions in light of the EMU crisis. A strand of the literature has investigated the feasibility of 
the proposed African monetary unions with regard to the optimality of currency areas 
(Asongu, 2013a) and adjustments to shocks (Alagidede et al., 2012). From the depth of our 
knowledge, only one paper has focused on CFA zones in light the crisis (Asongu, 2013b). 
This leaves room for at least five major challenges in the literature.  
 Firstly, but for a few exceptions (Moosa, 1997; Bae & Ratti, 2000; Starr, 2005; 
Nogueira, 2009), the literature on the long-term economic significance of money has 
abundantly focused on developed economies. Evidence provided by these works may not be 
quite relevant for African countries due to asymmetric financial dynamics. For example, 
financial depth in the perspective of deposits (or liabilities) is not equivalent to money supply 
in African countries because a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit via the 
banking sector (Asongu, 2011). Secondly, the empirical investigation on monetary aggregates 
has failed to take into consideration other proxies that are consistently exogenous to money 
supply. Accordingly, financial intermediary dynamics of efficiency (at banking and financial 
system levels), activity (from banking and financial system perspectives), and size 
substantially affect the velocity of money. Moreover, financial allocation efficiency is a 
significant issue in African countries because of the substantially documented surplus 
liquidity concerns (Saxegard, 2006; Fouda, 2009). Thirdly, soaring food prices that have 
recently marked the geopolitical landscape of Africa have not been braced adequately with 
short-term monetary policy measures to offset the rising price tide
2
. Fourthly, with the EMU 
crisis looming, understanding how monetary policy affects economic activity in existing 
monetary zones is a key concern in scholarly and policy making circles. Fifthly, the extent to 
which monetary policy influences output in the short-term and prices in the long-run in 
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 According to the Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute, monetary and exchange 
rate responses were not effective in curtailing food inflation (Von Braun, 2008).  
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developing countries remains open to debate. Hence, this paper is an extension of the 
scholarly and policy debate on how money matters in economic activity.  
 Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to complement existing literature by 
assessing the five challenges above in the CFA zones. A major lesson of the EMU crisis is 
that serious disequilibria in a monetary union result from arrangements not designed to be 
robust to a variety of shocks (Asongu, 2013b). We also contribute to the empirics of monetary 
policy by using hitherto unemployed aggregate monetary policy variables. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical underpinnings 
of the debate. The intuition motivating the empirics, data and the methodology are discussed 
in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical and empirical highlights 
   
2.1 The debate 
 
 For the interest of organization, we present the debate partially motivating the study in 
two strands: the traditional discretionary monetary policy strand and, the second strand of 
nontraditional policy regimes that limit the ability of monetary authorities to use policy in 
offsetting output fluctuations.  
 In recent years, the rewards of shifting from traditional discretionary monetary policy 
arrangements (that favor commitments to price stability and international economic 
integration such as monetary unions, inflation targeting, dollarization…etc) have been 
substantially covered in the literature. Accordingly, a positive side of discretionary policy is 
that, the monetary authority can use policy instruments to offset adverse shocks to output by 
either pursuing expansionary (when output is below its potential) or contractionary (when 
output is above its potential) policies. For example, in the former situation, a policy-controlled 
interest rate can be lowered in an effort to reduce commercial interest rates and stimulate 
aggregate spending. On the contrary, a monetary expansionary policy that lowers the real 
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exchange rate could boost demand for output by improving the competitiveness of a country’s 
products in domestic and world markets (Starr, 2005). In the same vein, a flexible 
countercyclical monetary policy can be practiced with inflation targeting (Ghironi & Rebucci, 
2000; Mishkin, 2002; Cavoli & Rajan, 2008; Cristadoro & Veronese, 2011; Levine, 2012). 
   The second strand on nontraditional policy regimes limits the ability of monetary 
authorities to use policy to offset output fluctuations. Accordingly, the degree by which a 
given country can instrument monetary policy to influence output in the short-run is an open 
debate. Studies in the USA have concluded that a decline in the key interest rate controlled by 
the Federal Reserve tends to boost output over the next 2-3 years, but the effect dissipates 
thereafter so that the long-term impact is limited to prices (Starr, 2005). A wealth of literature 
has focused on the short-run impact of monetary policy on output in other countries to assess 
whether the effects are similar to those in the USA. Conflicting results have been found in 17 
industrialized countries (Hayo, 1999). Moreover, studies in two middle income countries have 
found no evidence of Granger causality flowing from money to output, irrespective of the 
measurement of money used (Agenor et al., 2000). Hafer & Kutan (2002) have concluded that 
interest rate generally has a relatively more important mission in explaining output in twenty 
OECD
3
 countries whereas, Ganev et al. (2002) have found no such evidence in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Though the International Monetary Fund (IMF) places great emphasis on 
monetary policy in its programs (for developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA)) because it views such policies as crucial in managing inflation and stabilizing 
exchange rates, according to Weeks (2010), such an approach is absurdly inappropriate since 
the vast majority of governments in SSA lack the instruments to make monetary policy 
effective
4
.  
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 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
4
 Weeks (2010) postulates that SSA lacks two main channels for implementing monetary policy: (1) trying to 
influence the creation of private credit through so-called open market operations or; (2) seeking to influence the 
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2.2 Monetary policy in Africa 
 We discuss two country-specific conflicts in the first two strands, African monetary 
policy issues and resulting testable hypotheses motivating the empirical underpinnings of the 
study in the third and fourth strands respectively, before finally highlighting the empirics in 
the fifth strand.  
 Khan (2011) has recently investigated the nexus between GDP growth and different 
monetary aggregates in 20 SSA economies and found empirical support for the hypothesis 
that credit-growth is more closely linked than money-growth to the growth of real GDP. 
Mangani (2011) has assessed the effects of monetary policy on prices in Malawi and 
concluded on a lack of unequivocal evidence in support of the conventional channel of the 
policy transmission. The results suggest that exchange rate have been the most important 
variable in forecasting prices. Policy implications from the study recommend authorities to be 
more concerned with imported cost-push inflation that with demand-pull inflation
5
. In a slight 
contradiction, Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) have also examined the process via which monetary 
policy affects economic activity in Malawi and found that the bank rate to be the more 
effective measure of monetary policy than reserve money.  
Beside Malawi, some studies have also exclusively focused on South Africa: with 
Gupta et al.  (2010a) finding that house price inflation was negatively related to monetary 
policy shocks; Gupta et al. (2010b) showing that during the period of financial liberalization, 
interest rate shocks had relatively stronger effects on house price inflation irrespective of 
                                                                                                                                                        
borrowing rates for private sector by adjusting the interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow from the 
central bank.  
5
 Consistent with Mangani (2011), in the short-run, pursuing a prudent exchange rate policy that recognizes the 
country’s precarious foreign reserve position could be critical in deepening domestic price stability. Beyond the 
short-run, policy stability could be sustained through the implementation of policies directed towards the 
construction of a strong foreign exchange reserve base (as well as developing a sustainable approach to the 
country’s reliance on development assistance).  
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house sizes and; Ncube & Ndou (2010) complementing Gupta et al. (2010ab)
6
 with the 
suggestion that the direct effects of high interest rates on consumption appear to be more 
important in transmitting monetary policy to the economy than through indirect effects. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that monetary policy tightening can marginally weaken 
inflationary pressures (arising from excessive consumption) operating via house wealth and 
the credit channel. In order to demonstrate that monetary expansions and contractions may 
have different effects in different regions of the same country, Fielding & Shields (2005) have 
estimated the size of asymmetries across the 9 provinces of South Africa (over the period 
1997-2005) and found substantial differences in the response of prices to monetary policy. 
 The third strand focuses on issues of monetary policy effectiveness in targeting output 
and prices. Whereas a key economic risk is inflation, a weak monetary policy could also 
seriously exacerbate economic risks (The Economist, 2012). In line with Saxegaard (2006), 
going beyond acknowledging the threat of increasing inflation, several authors have observed 
that the abundance of liquidity is likely to have adverse effects on the ability of monetary 
policy to influence demand conditions and hence, stabilize the economy. Agénor et al. (2004) 
for example have noted that if banks already hold liquidity in excess of requirements, attempts 
by the monetary authorities to increase liquidity in an attempt to stimulate aggregate demand 
will prove largely ineffective. In the same vein, Nissanke & Aryeetey (1998) argue that in the 
presence of excess liquidity, it becomes difficult to effectively regulate money supply using 
the required reserve ratio and the money multiplier. Hence, one would expect excess liquidity 
to weaken the monetary policy transmission mechanism and consequently the use of 
monetary policy for stabilization purposes is undermined. Recent African studies focusing on 
monetary zones have established a broad absence of convergence of monetary policy 
variables in the CFA zones (Asongu, 2013b) and Fouda (2009) has emphasized excess 
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 While Gupta et al. (2010a,b) do not quantify the indirect effects of interest rate changes working through 
changes in house prices on consumer spending, Ncube & Ndou (2010) fill this gap by estimating and quantifying 
the role of house wealth in South Africa using disaggregated house prices.  
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liquidity issues in one of these CFA zones. A recent short-run Schumpeterian trip to 
embryonic African monetary zones has presented mixed results on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in managing short-run output (Asongu, 2013c). Causality analysis is 
performed with 7 financial development and 3 growth indicators in the proposed West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ). Results of the 
EAMZ are broadly consistent with the traditional discretionary monetary policy arrangements 
whereas those of the WAMZ are in line with the non-traditional strand of regimes in which, 
policy instruments in the short-run cannot be used to offset adverse shocks to output. In a nut 
shell, the surplus liquidity issues have generally been confirmed in recent African monetary 
literature (Asongu, 2013d), especially with respect to targeting inflation (Asongu, 2013e). 
This latter strand of studies has not included the CFA zones in their datasets in light of the 
Mundell conjecture (1972)
7
 and relative inflation certainty (Asongu, 2011)
8
. This leaves room 
for assessing the CFA zones.  
In light of the points presented in the introduction, the debate and issues raised in the 
third strand above, the following hypotheses will be tested in the empirical section.  
Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in the short-run 
in the CFA zones.  
Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in the 
long-run in the CFA zones.   
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 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition 
has stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; 
stability has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British 
countries by opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and 
better developed monetary institutions.” (Mundell, 1972,  pp. 42-43). 
8
 “The dominance of English common–law countries in prospects for financial development in the legal–origins 
debate has been debunked by recent findings. Using exchange rate regimes and economic/monetary integration 
oriented hypotheses, this paper proposes an 'inflation uncertainty theory' in providing theoretical justification 
and empirical validity as to why French civil–law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency. 
Inflation uncertainty, typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of 
financial intermediary institutions in English common–law countries. As a policy implication, results support the 
benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency” Asongu (2011, p.1). 
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Consistent with the position of Weeks (2010) on the inherent ineffectiveness of 
monetary policy in African countries discussed above, the insights from the ‘Blinder credit-
rationing model’ are useful in motivating the intuition for African empirics.  According to 
Blinder (1987), a rethinking of novel monetary policy dynamics is needed at times: “The 
reader should understand that this is merely an expositional device. I would not wish to deny 
that the interest elasticity and expectational error mechanisms have some validity. But the 
spirit of this paper is that those mechanisms do not seem important enough to explain the 
deep recessions that are apparently caused by central bank policy” (p. 2). The postulation of 
Blinder is even more relevant in recent memory when existing monetary and exchange rate 
responses have not been effective in addressing the recent food inflation (Von Braun, 2008).  
 
3. Intuition, Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Intuition for the empirics  
  
 Whereas there is a vast empirical work on the incidence of monetary policy on 
economic activity based on aggregate indicators of money supply, there is still (to the best of 
our knowledge) no employment of fundamental financial performance dynamics (that are 
exogenous to money supply) in the assessment of the long- and short-run effects of monetary 
policy on output and prices. With this in mind, we are aware of the risks of “doing 
measurement without past empirical basis” and postulate that reporting facts even in the 
absence of past supporting studies (in the context of an outstanding theoretical model) is a 
useful scientific activity. In addition, applied econometrics has other tasks than the mere 
validation or refutation of economic theories with existing expositions and prior analytical 
frameworks (Asongu, 2012; 2013fg). Hence, we discuss the economic/monetary intuition 
motivating the empirical underpinnings.  
From a broad standpoint, money supply can be viewed in terms of financial depth, 
financial allocation efficiency, financial activity and financial size. (1) Financial intermediary 
10 
 
depth could be defined both from an overall economic perspective and a financial system 
viewpoint. The justification for this distinction (as will be detailed in the data section) is 
straightforward: unlike the developed world, in developing countries a great chunk of the 
monetary base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 2011). (2) Financial 
allocation efficiency that reflects the fulfillment of the fundamental role of banks (in 
transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators) could be intuitively 
conceived as the ability of financial institutions to increase the velocity of money. (3) 
Financial activity (or credit availability) reflects the ability of banks to grant credit to 
economic operators and hence, the quantity of money in the economy. (4) Financial size 
mirrors the proportion of credit allocated by banking institutions to total assets in the financial 
system. Total assets here refer to ‘deposit bank assets’ plus ‘central bank assets’. Hence, it 
could be inferred that the above financial intermediary performance dynamics are exogenous 
to money supply and monetary policy.  
The choice of the monetary policy variables is broadly consistent with the empirical 
underpinnings of recent African monetary literature targeting inflation (Asongu, 2013d, e) and 
real GDP output (Asongu, 2013c). Accordingly, we are not the first to think out of the box 
when it comes to the empirics of monetary policy. Blinder (1987) in assessing the effects of 
monetary policy on economic activity completely banished interest rate elasticities: “In order 
to make credit rationing mechanism stand out in bold relief, most other channels of monetary 
policy (such as interest elasticities and expectational errors) are banished from the model” (p. 
2). The financial dynamic fundamentals entail all the dimensions identified by the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB). 
3.2 Data 
 
We investigate 5 CEMAC and 6 UEMOA countries with data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) and the FDSD of the WB for the period 1980-2010. The 
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descriptive statistics and details of the countries are presented in Panel A and Panel B 
respectively of Appendix 1. The definition of the variables and corresponding sources are 
detailed in Appendix 2. Consistent with the literature, the dependent variables are measured 
by real GDP output and the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
(Bordo & Jeanne, 2002; Bae et al., 2005; Hendrix et al., 2009).  
For clarity in presentation, the exogenous variables are discussed in terms of financial 
depth (money), financial activity (credit), financial allocation efficiency and financial size. 
Firstly, from a financial depth standpoint, the study is in line with the FDSD and recent 
African finance literature (Asongu, 2013a,b) in measuring financial depth both from overall-
economic and financial system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply  
(M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. Whereas the former denotes 
the monetary base (M0) plus demand, saving and time deposits, the latter represents liquid 
liabilities (or deposits) of the financial system
9
. Secondly, credit is measured in terms of 
financial intermediary activity. Therefore, the study seeks to lay emphasis on the ability of 
banks to grant credit to economic operators.  We proxy both for banking-system-activity and 
financial-system-activity with “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private 
credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. Thirdly, 
financial size is measured in terms of deposit bank assets (credit) as a proportion of total 
assets (deposit bank assets plus central bank assets). Fourthly, financial efficiency
10
 
appreciates the ability of deposits (money) to be transformed into credit (financial activity). 
This fourth indicator measures the fundamental role of banks in transforming mobilized 
deposits into credit for economic operators. We take into account indicators of banking-
                                                 
9
 It is relevant to distinguish between these two aggregates of money supply because, since we are dealing 
exclusively with developing (African) countries, a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit via formal 
banking institutions. 
10
 By financial efficiency in this context, we neither refer to the profitability-related concept (notion) nor to the 
production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: 
DEA). 
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system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: 
Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd’). With the exception of 
financial size, the correlation matrices presented in Appendix 3 show that the two measures 
adopted for each financial dynamic can be used to robustly check each other due to the high 
degree of substitution.  
3.3 Methodology 
 
The estimation strategy typically follows mainstream literature on testing the short-run 
effects of monetary policy variables on output and prices (Starr, 2005) and the long-run 
neutrality of monetary policy (Nogueira, 2009). The technique involves unit root and 
cointegration tests that assess the stationary properties and long-term relationships 
(equilibriums) respectively. In these investigations, the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) is applied for long-run effects whereas simple Granger causality is used for short-
term effects. Whereas application of the former model requires that the variables exhibit unit 
roots in levels (and have a long-run relationship (cointegration)), the latter is applied on the 
condition that variables are stationary (or do not exhibit unit roots). Impulse response 
functions are further used to assess the tendencies of significant Granger causality findings.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Unit root tests 
 
We assess the stationary properties using two types of first generation panel unit root 
tests. When the variables exhibit unit roots in levels, we proceed to examine their stationary 
properties in first difference. A condition for the employment of the VECM is that the 
variables should exhibit a unit root in levels and be stationary in first difference. Two main 
types of panel unit root tests are generally used: a first generation (that assumes cross-
sectional independence) and a second generation (based on cross-sectional dependence). A 
precondition for the use of the latter generation test is a cross-sectional dependence test which 
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is applicable only if the number of cross-sections (N) in the panel is above the number of 
periods in the cross-sections (T). Given that we have 31 periods (T) and 5 (or 6) cross-
sections (N), we are compelled to focus on the first generation tests. Accordingly, both the 
Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) tests are applied. Whereas 
the former is a homogenous oriented panel unit root test (common unit roots as null 
hypothesis), the latter is a heterogeneous based test (individual unit roots as null hypotheses). 
When the results are different, IPS (2003) takes precedence over LLC (2002) in decision 
making because in accordance with Maddala & Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis of LLC 
(2002) is too strong. Consistent with Liew (2004), goodness of fit (or optimal lag selection) is 
ensured by the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC) and the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) for the LLC (2002) and IPS (2003) tests respectively.  
Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
           
  Panel A: Unit root tests for CEMAC 
  LLC tests for homogenous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c -1.613* -0.336 -1.387* -1.120 -4.85*** -4.83*** 0.416 -7.72*** 2.165 
ct 1.217 2.063 -0.324 2.899 -1.002 -1.133 3.256 -7.25*** 0.685 
First 
difference 
c -5.05*** -7.43*** -10.4*** -7.74*** 0.476 0.191 -6.30*** na -7.71*** 
ct -4.49*** -6.01*** -6.40*** -6.23*** -1.52** -1.737 -6.21*** na -6.36*** 
           
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c -1.92** -0.470 -0.348 -0.614 -4.16*** -4.20*** 0.134 -7.03*** 3.645 
ct 1.674 2.853 -0.298 0.314 -1.35* -1.479* 3.093 -5.97*** 1.421 
First 
difference 
c -4.19*** -6.54*** -9.24*** -8.58*** na na -5.97*** na -8.16*** 
ct -3.32*** -4.76*** -6.39*** -8.33*** na na -5.11*** na -7.01*** 
           
  Panel B: Unit root tests for UEMOA 
  LLC tests for homogenous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 1.282 1.282 -4.69*** -3.04*** -1.559* -1.579* 2.453 -7.82*** 3.735 
ct 1.475 1.475 -3.15*** -1.422* 2.132 2.201 1.627 -6.73*** 0.308 
First 
difference 
c -5.27*** -6.65*** na na -7.43*** -7.33*** -8.78*** na -8.21*** 
ct -6.28*** -4.51*** na na -7.69*** -7.65*** -8.36*** na -6.90*** 
           
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 0.457 0.457 -3.30*** -2.25** -0.104 -0.112 2.764 -6.81*** 4.933 
ct 1.247 1.247 -1.422* -0.556 2.484 2.529 3.640 -5.43*** 0.236 
First 
difference 
c -5.80*** -5.97*** na -3.51*** -6.36*** -6.30*** -7.40*** na -8.25*** 
ct -5.17*** -4.03*** na -5.05*** -5.42*** -5.39*** -7.79*** na -7.13*** 
           
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. 
Maximum lag is 8 and optimal lags are chosen with the HQC for LLC test and  the AIC for IPS test. LLC: Levin, Lin & Chu (2002). IPS: Im, 
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Pesaran & Shin (2003).  M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial System 
Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dbacba: Deposit Bank Assets on Total Assets. CPI: 
Consumer Price Inflation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. 
UEMOA: Economic and Monetary Community of West African States 
 
Table 1 above shows results for the panel unit root tests. Whereas Panel A presents the 
findings for the CEMAC region, those of Panel B are for the UEMOA zone. For the two 
monetary zones, whereas the financial variables and ‘real output’ are overwhelmingly 
integrated in the first order (i.e: they can be differenced once to be stationary), inflation is 
stationary in levels. These findings broadly indicate the possibility of cointegration (long-run 
equilibrium) relationships among the financial variables and real output because; consistent 
with the Engle-Granger theorem, two variables that are not stationary in levels may have a 
linear combination in the long-run (Engle & Granger, 1987). 
4.2 Cointegration tests 
 
For long-run causality, let us consider output (y) and money (x), such that: 
y
tptyxptyxptyyptyyyt vxxyyy    ....... 11110                                             (1) 
x
tptxxptxxptxyptxyxt vxxyyx    ....... 11110                                               (2) 
We adopt the subscript convention that βxyp represents the coefficient of the output (y) in the 
equation for money (x) at lag p. Given that we are dealing with bivariate analysis, the two 
equations above are replicated for output and each monetary policy variable. The error terms 
in Eqs (1) and (2) represent the parts of yt and xt that are not related to past values of the two 
variables: the unpredictable “innovation” in each variable. The intuition for exogeneity has 
already been discussed in the data section.  When the output variable and monetary policy 
indicators of the VAR are cointegrated, we use the following vector error-correction (VEC) to 
estimate short-run adjustments to the long-run equilibrium.  
  yttàtyptyptyptyptyyt vxyxxyyy   11111110 .......     (3) 
  xttàtxptxptxptxptxxt vxyxxyyx   11111110 .......       (4) 
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where  
tt xy 10     
is the long-run cointegrating nexus between the two variables and 
y and x are the error-correction parameters that measure how y (output) and x (money) react 
to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. At equilibrium, the value of the error correction 
term (ECT) is zero. When this term is non-zero, it implies output and money have deviated 
from the long run equilibrium. Hence, the ECT helps each variable to adjust and partially 
restore the equation (cointegration) relationship. We shall replicate the same models (1 to 4) 
for all pairs of economic activity and monetary policy (depth, efficiency, activity and size). 
Similar deterministic trend assumptions used for cointegration tests will be applied and 
goodness of fit (in model specification) is based on the AIC
11
 (Liew, 2004).   
 The cointegration theory as highlighted above suggests that two (or more) variables 
that have a unit root in levels may have a linear combination (equilibrium) in the long-run. 
Accordingly, if two variables are cointegrated, it implies permanent movements in one of the 
variables affect permanent variations in the other variable and vice-versa. To investigate the 
potential long-run relationships, we test for cointegration using the Engle-Granger based 
Pedroni test, which is a heterogeneous panel-based test. While we have earlier employed both 
homogenous and heterogeneous panel based unit roots tests in Section 4.1, we disagree with 
Camarero & Tamarit (2002) in applying a homogenous Engle-Granger based Kao panel 
cointegration test because, it has less deterministic components. In principle, application of 
Kao (1999) in comparison to Pedroni (1999) presents substantial issues in deterministic 
assumptions
12
. Similar deterministic trend assumptions employed for the IPS (2003) unit root 
tests are used in the Pedroni (1999) heterogeneous cointegration test. The choice of bivariate 
statistics has a twofold justification ( advantage): on the one hand, it is in line with the 
                                                 
11
 Akaike Information Criterion.  
12
 Pedroni (1999) is applied in the presence of both ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ whereas, Kao (1999) is 
based only on the former (constant).   
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problem statements (hypotheses) and on the other hand, it mitigates misspecification issues in 
causality estimations
13
.  
 
                                                 
13
 For example, multivariate cointegration and the corresponding VECM may involve variables that are 
stationary in levels (See Gries et al., 2009).  
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Table 2: Bivariate heterogeneous Pedroni Engle-Granger based panel cointegration tests for the CEMAC and UEMOA zones  
               
 Panel A: Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Output for the CEMAC zone 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking Activity Financial Activity   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
  Panel v-Stats 0.934 0.898 -0.527 0.874 -0.468 0.632 -0.044 -0.185 na na na na -0.938 2.555*** 
Panel rho-Stats -0.164 -0.163 1.588 0.383 0.815 0.562 0.943 1.116 na na na na 1.337 -0.030 
Panel PP-Stats -0.341 -0.232 2.320 -0.404 1.140 -0.017 1.408 0.769 na na na na 1.795 -0.987 
Panel ADF-Stats -0.802 -1.552* 2.290 -1.112 1.176 -0.122 0.720 0.532 na na na na 1.708 -0.871 
               
Group rho-Stats 0.879 0.590 2.548 1.221 1.462 1.606 1.879 2.085 na na na na 2.285 0.417 
Group PP-Stats 0.263 -0.017 3.482 -0.002 1.970 0.872 2.283 1.780 na na na na 2.849 -1.08 
Group ADF-Stats -0.872 -1.448* 3.554 -1.140 2.006 0.695 1.265 1.632 na na na na 2.700 -0.964 
               
 Panel B: Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Output for the UEMOA zone 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output  Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking Activity Financial Activity   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
  Panel v-Stats 0.698 -1.240 -0.154 1.203 na na -0.279 1.337* -0.213 1.844** -0.213 1.849** -0.959 2.446*** 
Panel rho-Stats -0.235 0.621 1.237 -0.768 na na 1.549 -0.740 1.622 -0.495 1.616 -0.500 1.451 -0.239 
Panel PP-Stats -1.010 -1.014 1.603 -2.270 na na 2.418 -1.358* 2.469 -1.682** 2.460 -1.695** 1.232 -2.213** 
Panel ADF-Stats -2.86*** -2.052** 1.098 -2.52*** na na 2.839 -1.934** 3.036 -2.074** 3.031 -2.088** 1.184 -2.97*** 
               
Group rho-Stats 0.906 1.273 1.650 0.096 na na 2.431 0.480 2.382 0.607 2.378 0.601 1.894 0.766 
Group PP-Stats -0.319 -0.881 1.767 -2.189** na na 3.610 -0.542 3.542 -1.194 3.536 -1.213 0.931 -2.85*** 
Group ADF-Stats -1.829** -0.542 1.486 -2.66*** na na 4.001 -1.253 4.189 -1.918** 4.183 -1.937** 1.016 -3.53*** 
               
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. Fin: Financial. PP: Phillips-Peron. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. No deterministic 
trend assumption. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and Monetary Community of West African States.  
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Table 2 above presents the cointegration findings for the monetary policy variables 
and output
14
. While Panel A presents those of the CEMAC region, Panel B shows findings for 
the UEMOA zone. It can be observed that there is overwhelming support for the null 
hypotheses of no cointegration in both monetary zones. These results are broadly in line with 
the predictions of economic theory which suggest that monetary policy has no incidence on 
real output in the long-run. In other words, the absence of a long-run relationship between the 
monetary policy variables and output confirms the long-term neutrality of money.  It follows 
that in the CFA zones; permanent variations in financial intermediary dynamics (exogenous to 
monetary policy) do not affect permanent movements in real GDP output in the long-run. It is 
interesting to note that we have not involved the inflation dimension of economic activity in 
the cointegration tests because inflation is stationary in levels series (see Table 1). Overall, in 
the absence of any cointegration relationship among economic activity (output & inflation) 
and the monetary policy variables, we do not proceed to examine short-run adjustments with 
the VECM. Consistent with the Engle Granger theorem, in the absence of cointegration, 
short-run effects could be assessed by simply Granger causality. 
4. 3 Granger Causality for Monetary Policy and Economic Activity  
 
The VAR is also a natural framework for investigating Granger causality. Let us 
consider the two variable system in Eqs (1) and (2). The first equation models yt (economic 
activity) as a linear function of its own past values plus past values of x (money). If money 
Granger causes y, then some or all of the lagged x values have non-zero effects: lagged x 
affects yt conditional on the effects of lagged y. Therefore, testing for Granger causality in 
Eqs (1) and (2) amounts to testing the joint blocks of coefficients to see if they are zero or not. 
The null hypothesis of Eq. (1) is the position that, money does not Granger cause economic 
activity. A rejection of this null hypothesis is captured by the significant F-statistics, which is 
                                                 
14
 Note should be taken of the fact that, inflation (for both zones) , financial activity (for the CEMAC zone) and, 
banking system efficiency (for the UEMOA zone) are not taken into account in the cointegration analysis 
because they are stationary in levels. 
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the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis that estimated parameters of lagged values equal 
zero. Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is consistent with the recommendations of Liew 
(2004).   
Whereas in mainstream literature the Granger causality model is applied on variables 
that are stationary (in levels for the most part), within the framework of this study, we are also 
applying this test to all pairs in ‘first difference’ equations for three reasons: (1) ensure 
comparability; (2) consistency with application of the model to stationary variables and; (3) 
robustness checks in case we might have missed-out something in the unit root test 
specifications.  
 Table 3 below presents the Granger causality findings. While Panel A shows findings 
of the CEMAC zone, Panel B reveals those of the UEMOA region. Based on the findings of 
Panel A, it can be established that: (1)  monetary policy variables (of financial system 
efficiency and financial size)  have a short-term effect on real GDP output and; (2) all 
monetary policy variables have an incidence on  inflation in the short-run. In Panel B: (1) but 
for money supply, monetary policy variables overwhelmingly have a short-run effect on real 
GDP output and; (2) only financial activity (at banking and financial system levels) and 
financial size have an incidence on inflation 
Table 3: Short-run Granger causality analysis   
        
 Panel A: Monetary policy and Economic Activity for the CEMAC zone 
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 4.841*** 2.028 4.279** 4.023** 1.115 1.135 2.642* 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1
st
  Difference 0.493 1.179 0.138 2.472* 0.464 0.508 2.730* 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 3.069* 4.071** 1.257 6.479*** 11.80*** 11.90*** 2.364* 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1
st
  Difference 4.645** 4.381** 5.260*** 7.700*** 12.06*** 12.19*** 8.676*** 
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 Panel B: Monetary policy and Economic Activity for the UEMOA zone 
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.558 0.151 3.966** 8.119*** 7.616*** 7.630*** 0.998 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
 
1
st
  Difference 0.519 3.786** 3.014* 4.093** 6.458*** 6.467*** 3.243** 
        
        
 Null Hypothesis: Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels 0.284 0.351 0.887 1.076 1.705 1.706 3.416** 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
 
1
st
  Difference 1.273 1.918 0.398 0.836 4.109** 4.109** 3.230** 
        
Notes. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial 
credit on Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks (Banking System Activity). 
Pcrbof: Private credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank asset on Total 
assets (Banking System Size). Fin: Financial. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic 
and Monetary Community of West African States.  
 
Compared to the CEMAC zone, it appears that the UEMOA zone’s monetary 
authority has more policy instruments for offsetting output shocks but less instruments for the 
management of inflation in the short-run. The Granger causality results and corresponding F-
statistics upon which the conclusions are based cannot be used to draw any economic 
inferences. Hence, the impulse-response functions of such relationships will provide 
additional information (material) on the scale and timing of responses to shocks.  
 
4.4 Impulse responses  
 
Using a Choleski decomposition on a VAR with ordering: 1) inflation/output, 2) a 
monetary policy variable; we compute impulse response functions (IRFs) for economic 
activity and monetary policy. The dotted lines are the two standard deviation bands which are 
used to measure the significance (Agénor et al., 1997, p. 19). While only one graph in each 
Appendix will be discussed (that is, the response of economic activity to monetary policy), 
the presentation of the other complementary graphs is meant to confirm the general stability 
of the VAR models.  
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For the CEMAC zone: (1) as shown in Appendix 4 (Appendix 5), a positive shock in 
financial system allocation efficiency (financial size) will result in the positive incidence on 
real GDP output in the first year and; (2) from Appendix 6 to Appendix 12, it is broadly clear 
that a negative shock in the monetary policy variables significantly reduces inflation in the 
first year. The IFRs for the CEMAC zone are consistent with the predictions of economic 
theory. Concerning the UEMOA zone: (1) from Appendix 13 to Appendix 17, it is observed 
that a negative shock in monetary variables significantly decreases output during the first 
year
15
  while a positive shock in financial size increases output for the next two years 
(Appendix 18) and; (2) a positive shock in monetary policy increases inflation during the first 
year (Appendices 19 and 20), while a negative shock mitigates inflation during the same 
period (Appendix 21). The IFRs for the UEMOA zone are also consistent with the predictions 
of economic theory. 
Due to space constraints we cannot discuss the time-dynamic responses of economic 
activity to each monetary policy shock in detail. However, two important temporary 
significances are worth mentioning: (1) the responses to the shocks are significant and 
consistent with the predictions of economic theory for the most part during the first years and; 
(2) the effect of monetary policy shocks on the temporary component of economic activity 
generally dissipates within a horizon of 4 to 6 years.  
 
4.5 Robustness checks 
 
In order to ensure that the estimations and corresponding results are robust, the 
following have been performed or checked.  (1) With the exception financial size, for almost 
every financial variable (depth, efficiency or activity), two indicators have been employed.  
Therefore, the findings have broadly encompassed measures of monetary policy variables 
from banking and financial system perspectives. (2) Both homogenous and heterogeneous 
                                                 
15
 An exception is the ‘banking system efficiency’ negative shock that mitigates inflation for the next two years 
(see Appendix 14).  
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assumptions have been taken into account in the unit root tests. (3) Optimal lag selection for 
model specifications has been in accordance with the goodness of fit recommendations of 
Liew (2004)
16
. (4) Granger causality has been tested both in level and first difference 
equations (for reasons already outlined above). (5) Impulse response functions have been used 
to further examine the tendencies of significant Granger causality results and general stability 
of the VAR models.  
 
4.6 Discussion and policy implications 
 
4.6.1 Retrospect to tested hypotheses  
 
Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in the short-run 
in the CFA zones.  
 Firstly, we have not been able to establish whether monetary policy variables affect 
prices in the long-term because for both CFA zones, the inflation variable has been stationary 
in levels. Thus the absence of a (an) chaotic (unstable) inflation has limited the feasibility of 
any cointegration analysis between inflation and the monetary policy variables. Secondly, the 
overwhelming significant causality flowing from financial variables to prices (especially in 
the CEMAC zone) in the short-term is not consistent with the predictions of economic theory 
and/or the second part of Hypothesis 1. Hence in light of the above, Hypothesis 1 is broadly 
untrue. This invalidity is more visible in the CEMAC zone (relative to all monetary policy 
variables) than in the UEMOA region (relative to financial dynamics of activity and size).  
 
                                                 
16
 “The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to 
pick up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases 
substantially as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is 
found to outdo the rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better 
choice for smaller sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation 
among all criteria under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The 
findings in this simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC 
in previous empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches 
in the determination of autoregressive lag length” (Liew, 2004, p. 2).  
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Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in the 
long-run in the CFA zones. 
 Firstly, the absence of any cointegration between real output and the monetary policy 
variables in both CFA zones confirm the long-term dimension of Hypothesis 2 on the 
neutrality of money. As for the short-run dimension, it is more valid for the UEMOA zone 
(with the exception of overall money supply) than for the CEMAC region (in which only 
financial dynamics of ‘financial system efficiency’ and financial activity support the 
hypothesis).  
 
4.6.2 Implications for the long-run neutrality of money and business cycles  
 
From a traditional standpoint, economic theory has suggested that monetary policy can 
affect the business cycle, but not the long-run potential output. Despite  a substantial 
theoretical and empirical  consensus on money neutrality (well documented in the literature), 
the role of money as an informational variable for monetary policy decisions has remained 
open to debate with empirical studies providing conflicting results. The long-run neutrality of 
money has been confirmed both for the CEMAC and UEMOA regions. From a business cycle 
perspective, we have seen that monetary policy can be used to offset output shocks in both 
CFA zones. However, more policy instruments are available for the UEMOA zone than for its 
CEMAC counterpart. The latter can use only financial system efficiency  and financial 
activity  as  policy instruments while the former can use all financial intermediary dynamics 
considered in the analysis (with the exception of money  supply). The ineffectiveness of 
overall economic money supply (M2) as a policy instrument in offsetting short-term output 
shocks (in both zones) confirms the existing consensus that a great chunk of money supply in 
African countries does not transit through formal banking institutions.  
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4.6.3 Implications for credit expansions and inflationary tendencies (targeting) 
 
 There is a general consensus among analysts that significant money stock expansions 
that are not coupled with sustained credit availability improvements are less likely to have any 
inflationary effects. This position is broadly true in the long-run since monetary policy 
variables should theoretically have no incidence on prices in the short-term. From the 
hypotheses that have been investigated in the study, we could reframe the consensus into an 
important question that policy makers are most likely to ask today: “would expansionary 
monetary policy in the CFA zones exert any inflationary pressures on prices in the short-
term?” The results broadly indicate that monetary policy can be used in the short-run to affect 
prices and this is more relevant for the CEMAC zone than it is for the UEMOA region. 
Hence, the former zone had more policy instruments at its disposal to mitigate soaring food 
prices that marked the geopolitical landscape of most African countries in 2008 (with riots 
and social unrests).  
 
4.6.4 Other policy implications: how do the findings reflect the ongoing debate?   
 
 The long-term effect (neutrality) of monetary policy on output and the significance of 
financial variables in affecting short-term output (that are more relevant for the UEMOA 
zone), are part of our findings that are consistent with the traditional discretionary monetary 
policy arrangements that favor commitments to price stability and international economic 
integration. Conversely, the significance of financial variables in affecting short-term prices 
(that are more relevant for the CEMAC zone) are part of the findings that are consistent with 
the second strand of the debate which sustains that, non-traditional policy regimes limit the 
ability of monetary authorities to use policy effectively for long-run inflation targeting. This is 
factual because we expected monetary policy not to have any impact on inflation in the short-
run. From a general standpoint, it could be established that the CEMAC region is more 
inclined to non-traditional policy regimes while the UEMOA zone dances more to the tune of 
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traditional discretionary monetary policy arrangements. Evidence of the CEMAC stance is 
supported by the fact that it has only two policy instruments at its disposal for pursuing either 
an expansionary or a contractionary policy in the management of short-term output shocks.  
 
4.6.5 Country-specific implications  
 
 The surplus liquidity issues substantially documented in the literature on the CFA 
zones (Fouda, 2009; Saxegaard, 2006), may be due to the weight of political instability in 
some of the sampled countries. Accordingly, Fielding & Shortland (2005) have confirmed the 
positive relationship between violent political incidence and excess liquidity. Whereas non-
arbitrarily disentangling ‘conflict-affected’ countries may present analytical and practical 
difficulties (essentially because few countries in Africa are completely free from conflicts), 
few would object the extension of the Fielding & Shortland conjecture to Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Chad and the Republic of Congo given the sampled period. 
  
4.6.6 Fighting surplus liquidity 
 
 Consistent with Asongu (2013e), policies devoted to tackling surplus liquidity will be 
efficient if they are in line with the reasons for holding liquidity: voluntary or involuntary. 
First, voluntary holding of excess liquidity could be reduced by: easing difficulties 
encountered by banks in tracking their positions at the central bank that may require them to 
hold reserves above the statutory thresholds; reinforcement of institutions that would favor 
interbank lending so as to ease borrowing between banks for contingency purposes and; 
improve infrastructure so that remote bank branches may not need to hold excess reserves due 
to transportation problems. Second,  involuntary holding of surplus liquidity could also be 
mitigated by: decreasing the inability of banks to lend, especially in situations where interest 
rates are regulated
17
; creating conditions to sustain the spread between bonds and reserves so 
                                                 
17
 This is the case of the CEMAC region in which the central bank sets a floor for lending rates and a ceiling for 
deposit rates above and below which interest rates are negotiated freely. 
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that commercial banks can invest surplus liquidity in the bond markets; stifling the 
unwillingness of banks to expand lending by mitigating asymmetric information and lack of 
competition and; developing regional stock exchange markets to broaden investment 
opportunities for commercial banks.  
 
4.6.7 Caveats and future directions  
 
 The main caveat in this study is that we have only taken into account financial 
intermediary performance determinants of output and inflation in the analysis. However, in 
the real world economic activity (from real output and inflation perspectives) is endogenous 
to a complex set of variables: exchange rates, price controls, wage…etc. Hence, the 
interactions of financial depth, efficiency, activity and size with other determinants of 
economic activity could result in other dynamics of consumer price inflation and real output. 
Therefore, replication of the analysis with other fundamentals of economic activity in a 
multivariate VAR context would be interesting. Another very relevant future research 
direction could be to examine whether the findings are relevant to country-specific cases of 
the sampled CFA zones. In so doing, policy makers could be enlightened more on which 
particular countries in the CFA zones need more adjustments in their monetary policy 
macroeconomic fundamentals. It is also worthwhile noting that consistent with Wooldridge 
(2002), the degrees of freedom may not be optimal for model specification. However, owing 
to the specific character of the sampled countries (monetary zones), issues in degrees of 
freedom are not unprecedented (Saxegaard, 2006; Waliullah et al., 2010; Asongu, 2012c) and 
avoidable.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
A major lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria in a monetary union 
result from arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. With the specter of 
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this crisis looming substantially and scarring existing monetary zones, the present study has 
complemented existing literature by analyzing the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity (output and prices) in the CEMAC and UEMOA CFA zones. By using a plethora of 
hitherto unemployed financial dynamics (that broadly reflect money supply), we have 
provided a significant contribution to the empirics of monetary policy. 
Two main hypotheses have been tested. Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables 
affect prices in the long-run but not in the short-run in the CFA zones (Broadly untrue). This 
invalidity is more pronounced in CEMAC (relative to all monetary policy variables) than in 
UEMOA (relative to financial dynamics of activity and size). Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy 
variables influence output in the short-term but not in the long-run in the CFA zones. Firstly, 
the absence of co-integration among real output and the monetary policy variables in both 
zones confirm the long-term dimension of the hypothesis on the neutrality of monetary policy. 
The validity of its short-run dimension is more relevant in the UEMOA zone (with the 
exception of overall money supply) than in the CEMAC zone (in which only financial 
dynamics of ‘financial system efficiency’ and financial activity support the hypothesis). 
These findings have two main implications for the ongoing debate on monetary policy.  
(1) Compared to the CEMAC zone, the UEMOA zone’s monetary authority has more policy 
instruments in offsetting output shocks but fewer instruments for the management of short-run 
inflation. (2) The CEMAC region is more inclined to non-traditional policy regimes while the 
UEMOA zone dances more to the tune of traditional discretionary monetary policy 
arrangements. Moreover we have also discussed other policies implications. (1) On the 
implications for the long-run neutrality of money and business cycles, the UEMOA zone has 
more policy instruments than its CEMAC counterpart, since the latter can use only financial 
system efficiency and financial activity as policy instruments whereas the former can use all 
financial intermediary dynamics considered in the analysis (with a slight exception of money 
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supply).  (2) Concerning implications for credit expansions and inflation targeting, monetary 
policy can be used in the short-run to affect prices to a greater extend in the CEMAC zone 
than in the UEMOA region. (3) The surplus liquidity issues could also be traceable to political 
instability in some member states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
             
   Panel A: Summary Statistics 
   CEMAC UEMOA 
   Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
Economic   
Activity  
Inflation  4.369 8.643 -17.64 41.72 141 4.247 7.020 -7.796 39.16 177 
Real  Output  9.422 0.580 7.900 10.37 150 9.543 0.347 8.856 10.36 186 
 
 
 
Finance 
Fin. 
Depth  
M2 0.159 0.046 0.047 0.282 128 0.234 0.071 0.069 0.446 172 
Fdgdp 0.090 0.049 0.027 0.234 128 0.159 0.058 0.045 0.336 172 
Fin. 
Efficiency 
BcBd 1.255 0.723 0.384 5.411 145 1.191 0.538 0.508 3.693 180 
FcFd 1.231 0.633 0.402 3.979 128 1.139 0.414 0.521 2.330 172 
Fin. 
Activity  
Pcrb 0.109 0.076 0.023 0.316 128 0.179 0.083 0.035 0.412 172 
Pcrbof  0.108 0.075 0.023 0.316 128 0.179 0.083 0.035 0.412 172 
Fin. Size Dbacba 0.682 0.189 0.152 1.091 139 0.757 0.120 0.435 1.049 180 
             
   Panel B: Presentation of countries 
 
CEMAC Zone (5) Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea , Gabon 
UEMOA  Zone (6) Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
             
S.D: Standard  Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations. Fin: Financial. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and Monetary Community of West African States.  
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Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Inflation   Infl. Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Real Output  Output  Logarithm of Real GDP World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic financial depth 
(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system depth (Liquid 
liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP)   World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system allocation 
efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system allocation 
efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system deposits  World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Size  Dbacba  Deposit bank assets/ Total assets (Deposit bank assets 
plus Central bank assets) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Infl: Inflation. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. CEMAC: 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and Monetary Community of West African States. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrices  
           
Panel A: CEMAC Zone  
Economic Activity Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity F. Size  
Inflation Output M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba  
1.000 0.019 -0.134 0.002 -0.214 -0.202 -0.086 -0.086 -0.058 Inflation 
 1.000 0.206 0.632 -0.538 -0.561 0.121 0.117 0.559 Output 
  1.000 0.612 0.260 0.207 0.630 0.625 0.376 M2 
   1.000 -0.065 -0.104 0.722 0.716 0.681 Fdgdp 
    1.000 0.931 0.552 0.555 0.061 BcBd 
     1.000 0.556 0.561 -0.015 FcFd 
      1.000 0.999 0.529 Pcrb 
       1.000 0.527 Pcrbof 
        1.000 Dbacba 
           
Panel B: UEMOA Zone  
Economic Activity Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity F. Size  
Inflation Output M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba  
1.000 -0.107 0.002 -0.038 0.113 0.159 0.113 0.114 -0.011 Inflation 
 1.000 0.086 0.048 0.001 0.174 0.236 0.238 0.405 Output 
  1.000 0.952 -0.041 -0.058 0.569 0.568 0.356 M2 
   1.000 -0.050 -0.069 0.576 0.575 0.337 Fdgdp 
    1.000 0.975 0.729 0.728 0.056 BcBd 
     1.000 0.742 0.742 0.246 FcFd 
      1.000 1.000 0.348 Pcrb 
       1.000 0.348 Pcrbof 
        1.000 Dbacba 
           
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit s (Banking  System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on 
Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: 
Private credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank asset on Total assets 
(Banking system size). Fin: Financial. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and 
Monetary Community of West African States.  
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Appendix 4: Financial System Efficiency and real GDP output (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 5: Financial Size and real GDP output (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 6: Money Supply and Inflation (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 7: Liquid liabilities and Inflation (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 8: Banking System Efficiency and Inflation (CEMAC) 
 
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(INFLATION) to D(INFLATION)
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(INFLATION) to D(BCBD)
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(BCBD) to D(INFLATION)
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(BCBD) to D(BCBD)
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
Appendix 9: Financial System Efficiency and Inflation (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 10: Banking System Activity   and Inflation (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 11: Financial System Activity   and Inflation (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 12: Financial Size and Inflation (CEMAC) 
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Appendix 13: Liquid Liabilities and real GDP output (UEMOA) 
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Appendix 14: Banking System Efficiency and real GDP output (UEMOA) 
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Appendix 15: Financial System Efficiency and real GDP output (UEMOA) 
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Appendix 16: Banking System Activity and real GDP output (UEMOA) 
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Appendix 17: Financial System Activity and real GDP output (UEMOA) 
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Appendix 18: Financial Size and real GDP output (UEMOA) 
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Appendix 19: Banking System Activity and Inflation (UEMOA) 
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